The Admiralty and the Royal Navy made extensive use of the British fishing fleet in a variety of auxiliary roles during the First World War. On demobilisation the emphasis quickly switched to increasing the economic output of the British fishing industry and many of the wartime lessons were lost during the following decade. Throughout the interwar period the Admiralty struggled to frame a requirement for the contribution of the fishing fleet in during any future conflict. The contrary interests of minesweeping, anti-submarine warfare and fisheries protection were not reconciled with the result that the overall requirement was never fully visible.

As the Second World War approached the Admiralty’s planning was further hampered by a loss of corporate understanding of the fishing fleet’s capabilities, a lack of technical intelligence (in the case of minesweeping) and by the effect of the British fishing crisis. This paper examines the Admiralty’s attempts to establish a coherent policy for the employment of the fishing fleet in an auxiliary role during the interwar period and its results on the outbreak of the Second World War.